Two weeks ago, I argued that conception of moral responsibility in the Iliad is very different from our own. In Homer’s world, the Gods, Fate, and irresistible passion often determine the heroes’ behavior—but that doesn’t let them off of the hook. They’re still responsible, they still deserve blame, and if you want to disembowel them (and taunt them while you’re doing it), knock yourself out.
You can see this seemingly weird notion of responsibility in Agamemnon as well. By most accounts, Agamemnon had to sacrifice of Iphigenia—he had no choice. Zeus had determined that the ships would sail and destroy Troy, and you can’t buck the will of Zeus. Yet Clytemnestra (certainly) and the chorus (arguably) still blame Agamemnon for killing his daughter. Some commentators have gone so far as to call this attitude logically inconsistent. The critic Albin Lesky writes:
You can see this seemingly weird notion of responsibility in Agamemnon as well. By most accounts, Agamemnon had to sacrifice of Iphigenia—he had no choice. Zeus had determined that the ships would sail and destroy Troy, and you can’t buck the will of Zeus. Yet Clytemnestra (certainly) and the chorus (arguably) still blame Agamemnon for killing his daughter. Some commentators have gone so far as to call this attitude logically inconsistent. The critic Albin Lesky writes:
If one makes a clear logical distinction, of course, one will say: "A man who acts under necessity is not acting voluntarily." But to insist upon logical consistency would mean that we should have to reject considerable parts of Aeschylus' tragedies.... Is not the campaign against Troy a just punishment inflicted on behalf of the highest god, Zeus, who protects the rights of hospitality? Thus, Agamemnon acts on behalf of the god who wills this punishment. And yet the price for this punishment is a terrible guilt, for which the king has to atone with his death. Here there is no logical consistency. (my italics)
Now as a philosopher I know something about logical consistency, and there is nothing inconsistent about holding people morally responsible for acts that they were compelled to perform. Short dialogue to make this point:
Lesky: Hey Clytemnestra, why’d you kill Agamemnon—he had to sacrifice Iphigenia to fulfill the will of Zeus. He had no choice!
Clytemnestra: I don’t care if he had a choice or not. He did kill her. So he deserves to die. Period.
Is Clytemnestra contradicting herself here? Of course not. There’s no inconsistency, she just doesn’t place the same conditions on guilt and responsibility that Lesky does (and that we do in the contemporary West).
A better word to describe this view of guilt and moral responsibility at guilt is "counterintuitive." It just seems unfair to blame and kill people for an action that they did not choose to commit of their own free will. It might be logically consistent, but it still seems primitive, backwards, weird.
But what if we’re the weird ones? What if our conception of responsibility as dependent on choice and control is the exception rather than the rule? Research in cross-cultural psychology suggests this might be the case. If you have some time, check out this article, “The Weirdest People in the World,” by Joe Henrich and colleagues in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. The "weird" in the title refers both to "peculiar" but also to "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic" societies. The article documents a number of ways that the values and perceptions of people in WEIRD societies (like the U.S.) differ from the rest of the world. Many of our core values and beliefs—the ones we think of as “self-evident”—are simply not shared by other cultures. Not only that, most societies both today and throughout history have not been WEIRD. We’re in the minority. We’re the weird ones!
One of these cross-cultural differences concerns the way people regard choice and control. People in WEIRD societies (1) place much more value on individual choice and personal autonomy, and (2) perceive themselves as making more autonomous choices (in identical scenarios), than people in other societies. In America (a prime example of a WEIRD culture), we think “yes my environment may influence or predispose me to do certain things, but ultimately it’s up to me what I do. My free will is in charge. By contrast, people in non-WEIRD societies are more prone to regard themselves and their behavior within the context of their group, their relationships and social environment. They are less likely to attribute their actions to their individual will.
Bringing this back to Agamemnon—you can see how in a non-WEIRD society, the question of whether Agamemnon had a choice just wouldn’t matter as much for determining guilt and responsibility. In fact, the issue never really comes up throughout the play. The chorus, in their condemnation of Clytemnestra, doesn’t mention it. We might think the justice of Clytemnestra’s act of revenge is deeply connected to the question of choice—but they don’t. This isn’t illogical or irrational. It isn’t even weird.
Sources:
Henrich, J. et al. “The weirdest people in the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2010) 33: 61-8
Lesky, A. "Decision and Responsibility in the Tragedy of Aeschylus," Journal of Hellenic Studies 86 (1966): 78-85, 82-83.
—Tamler Sommers